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Abstract
The European Union (EU) provides grants to disadvantaged regions of mem-
ber states to allow them to catch up with the EU average. Under the Ob-
jective 1 scheme, NUTS2 regions with a GDP per capita level below 75%
of the EU average qualify for structural funds transfers from the central EU
budget. This rule gives rise to a regression-discontinuity design that exploits
the discrete jump in the probability of EU transfer receipt at the 75% thresh-
old. Additional variability arises for smaller regional aggregates – so-called
NUTS3 regions – which are nested in a NUTS2 mother region. Whereas some
relatively rich NUTS3 regions may receive EU funds because their NUTS2
mother region qualifies, other relatively poor NUTS3 regions may not receive
EU funds because their NUTS2 mother region does not qualify. We find
positive growth effects of Objective 1 funds, but no employment effects. A
simple cost-benefit calculation suggests that Objective 1 transfers are not only
effective, but also cost-efficient.
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1 Introduction
Most federations – national or supra-national in scope – rely on a system of fiscal
federalism which allows for transfers across jurisdictions. Examples of such national
federations are the United States of America or the German States (La¨nder). An
example of a supra-national federation is the European Union (EU). The most im-
portant aim of the aforementioned transfers is to establish equalization – at least
partially – of fiscal capacity and per-capita income among the participating juris-
dictions (see Ma 1997).
In comparison to other federations, the magnitude of equalization transfers is par-
ticularly large within the EU. Before briefly summarizing the EU system of transfers,
it is useful to introduce the administrative regional units in the EU. EUROSTAT,
the statistical office of the European Commission, distinguishes between three sub-
national regional aggregates: NUTS1 (large regions with a population of 3-7 million
inhabitants); NUTS2 (groups of counties and unitary authorities with a population
of 0.8-3 million inhabitants); and NUTS3 regions (counties of 150-800 thousand
inhabitants).1
The largest part of fiscal equalization transfers at the level of the EU is spent un-
der the auspices of the Structural Funds Programme. Most of the associated transfers
are assigned at the NUTS2 level. Overall, the Structural Funds Programme currently
distinguishes between transfers under three mutually exclusive schemes: Objective
1, Objective 2 and Objective 3. We confine our analysis to Objective 1 treatment for
three reasons. First, Objective 1 funding has the explicit aim of fostering GDP-per-
capita growth in regions that are lagging behind the EU average and of promoting
aggregate growth in the EU (European Commission 2001). Second, Objective 1
expenditures form the largest part of the overall Structural Funds Programme bud-
get. They account for more than two thirds of the programme’s total budget: 70%
in the 1988-1993 period, 68% in the 1994-1999 period and 72% in the 2000-2006
period (see EU 1997, p. 154f., and EU 2007, p. 202). Third, Objective 1 regula-
tions have been largely unchanged over the three programming periods for which
we have data.2 A region classifies for Objective 1 transfers if its GDP per capita in
1NUTS is the acronym for N omenclature des U nite´s Territoriales S tatistiques coined by EU-
ROSTAT. The highest level of regional aggregation (NUTS1) corresponds to Germany’s Bun-
desla¨nder, France’s Zones d’E´tudes et d’Ame´nagement du Territoire, the United Kingdom’s Re-
gions of England/Scotland/Wales or Spain’s Grupos de Comunidades Auto´nomas. At the other
end of the NUTS classification scheme, NUTS3 regions correspond to Landkreise in Germany,
to De´partements in France, to Unitary Authorities in the UK or to Comunidades Auto´nomas in
Spain.
2Objective 2 covers regions that face socioeconomic problems which are mainly defined by high
unemployment rates. More precisely, regions must satisfy three criteria to be eligible for Objective
2
purchasing power parity terms (PPP) is less than 75% of the EU average. For the
programming periods 1989-93, 1994-99, and 2000-06, the EU commission computed
the relevant threshold of GDP per capita in PPP terms based on the figures for
the last three years of data available when the Commission’s regulations came out.
Those were the years 1984-86, 1988-90, and 1995-97, respectively.
Transfer eligibility is thus determined in advance for a whole programming period
of several years. For instance, in the 1994-99 programming period, the European
Commission provided Objective 1 transfers to 64 out of 215 NUTS2 regions in
the EU15 area. A graphical illustration of the regions receiving Objective 1 funds
(“treated regions”) across the three most recent budgetary periods is provided in
Figure 1.
Figure 1 and Table 1 about here
The amounts that are paid are quite significant for the recipient regions. In the
1994-99 programming period the 64 NUTS2 regions received on average transfer in
the order of 1.5 percent of their GDP (see European Commission, 1997, 2007; Table
1 provides information for the three most recent programming periods). A number
of questions relating to these expenses are of obvious interest to both policy makers
and economists. To which extent do economic outcomes in the recipient regions
actually respond to such re-distributional transfers? This calls for an evaluation of
the overall (causal) impact of transfers. Moreover, one could ask about the efficiency
of transfers: Does the response in economic outcome in the treated regions justify
the size of the programme and, in particular, its costs to the untreated net-paying
jurisdictions? Surprisingly little is known to answer these questions.
A small number of previous studies looked into the impact of re-distributional
regional policies on economic outcomes (see section 2 for a detailed discussion of the
literature). Most of that research focused on the impact of the EU’s Structural Funds
Programme. Yet, essentially all existing work on that topic uses fairly aggregated
regional data at the NUTS1 or NUTS2 level. This might be problematic because,
by design of the programme, regions which are eligible for transfer payments under
2 transfers: first, an unemployment rate above the Community average; second, a higher percent-
age of jobs in the industrial sector than the Community average; and, third, a decline in industrial
employment. Objective 3 deals with the promotion of human capital. The main goal is the sup-
port of the adaption and modernization of education, training and employment policies in regions.
Objectives 2 and 3 were modified slightly over the programming periods considered here. In 1989-
93 and 1994-99 three additional objectives of minor importance existed which were abolished in
2000-06. For the new programming period 2007-2013 the three objectives have been renamed Con-
vergence objective, Regional Competitiveness and Employment objective and European Territorial
Co-operation objective.
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Objective 1 (“poor regions”) differ systematically from non-eligible ones (“rich re-
gions”). Furthermore, with regard to transfers under the auspices of the Structural
Funds Programme, most papers use cross-sectional data. Hence, the level of ag-
gregation and cross-sectional nature of the data employed in previous work renders
identification of the causal effect of the programme difficult if not impossible.
We compile data on 1213 NUTS3 regions in Europe for three programming peri-
ods – 1989-93, 1994-99, and 2000-06 – to assess the causal effect of transfers through
the EU’s Structural Funds Programme on economic outcomes such as average annual
growth of GDP per capita and employment growth of NUTS3 regions. The 75%
threshold at the NUTS2 level gives rise to a regression-discontinuity design whereby
regions very close to that threshold are likely to be very similar ex ante, but those
below the 75% threshold qualify for Objective 1 funds, whereas those above do not.
Our identification strategy is strengthened through the use of data at the NUTS3
level. In particular, we exploit variation in GDP per capita across NUTS3 juris-
dictions within eligible or non-eligible NUTS2 regions. For instance, some of the
NUTS3 regions in eligible (and actually transfer-receiving) NUTS2 aggregates were
richer than the pre-specified threshold level which determines transfer eligibility at
the NUTS2 level. These regions were assigned to Objective 1 status, but would not
have qualified had they been independent entities. Similarly, some of the NUTS3 re-
gions in non-eligible (transfer non-recipient) NUTS2 regions had a per-capita GDP
below the threshold determining eligibility at the higher level of aggregation, so
would have been eligible for Objective 1 status as independent entities, but were
assigned to the non-treatment group. Exploitation of this variation in per-capita
income across NUTS3 regions within eligible and non-eligible NUTS2 regions al-
lows for a much richer design than in previous work and permits the identification
of the causal effect of the EU’s fiscal transfer programme on economic outcomes.
The key feature is that, within a narrow band around the 75% eligibility threshold,
there are treated and untreated NUTS3 regions on both sides of the threshold which
are otherwise very similar, even in terms of their per capita GDP. We use both
cross-sectional and panel variation, the latter giving rise to a difference-in-difference
regression discontinuity design (DID-RDD).
The analysis identifies a small positive impact of Objective 1 transfers on regional
growth of GDP per capita which is robust to period choice and estimation methods
applied. In the preferred specification and procedure, we estimate that Objective 1
programme participation exerts a differential impact on GDP-per-capita growth of
about 1.8 percentage points within the same programming period. With respect to
employment we find a significant positive effect of about 0.5 percentage points only
in the last programming period. However, it is not explicitly and directly the aim
of Objective 1 to stimulate employment growth in the treated regions.
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Altogether, a back-of-the envelope calculation suggests that – on average – the
funds spent on Objective 1 have a return which is about 1.21 times higher than
their costs in terms of GDP. Hence, the programme seems effective and relatively
efficient with regard to fostering GDP-per-capita growth in the recipient regions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides
a discussion of the state of the literature on the evaluation of the Structural Funds
Programme. Section 3 presents our data and shows descriptives on treated (i.e.
Objective 1) and untreated (i.e. non-Objective 1) NUTS2 and NUTS3 regions.
Section 4 shows the findings about the (causal) effects of Objective 1 treatment on
the growth of GDP per capita and employment when using our quasi-experimental
design. Section 5 provides sensitivity checks and a back-of-the-envelope calculation
of the efficiency of the European Union’s Objective 1 Programme. The last section
concludes with a summary of the most important findings.
2 Effects of the Structural Funds Programme:
state of the debate
The interest in effects of the EU’s structural policy roots in empirical work on
regional growth and convergence. In particular, Sala-i-Martin (1996) started the
debate by diagnosing from cross-sectional regressions that the regional growth and
convergence pattern in the EU was not different from the one in other federations
which lack such an extensive cohesion programme. Obviously, such a conclusion
requires comparability of federations and their regions in all other respects, which
is not necessarily the case. However, Boldrin and Canova (2001) came to similar
conclusions when focusing on regional growth within the EU and comparing recipient
and non-recipient regions. Yet, both papers did not specifically focus on Objective
1, which primarily aims at closing the gap in per-capita income, but at the combined
Structural Funds Programme. Furthermore, they used fairly aggregated NUTS2 and
NUTS1 data, since data at the NUTS3 level was not available at the time.
The latter evidence is in contrast to the findings of Midelfart-Knarvik and Over-
man (2002) who identify a positive impact of the Structural Funds Programme on
industry location and agglomeration at the national level.3 Similarly, Beugelsdijk
and Eijffinger (2005) and Ederveen, de Groot and Nahuis (2006) took a national
perspective and found a positive relationship between Structural Funds Programme
spending and GDP-per-capita growth (at least, in countries with favorable insti-
tutions). At the sub-national (NUTS1 or NUTS2) level, Cappelen, Castellacci,
3However, they find that the funds seem to stimulate economic activity counter to the compar-
ative advantage of the recipient countries.
5
Fagerberg and Verspagen (2003) as well as Ederveen, Gorter, de Mooij and Nahuis
(2002) detect a significant positive impact of structural funds on regional growth
while Dall’erba and Le Gallo (2008) do not support this conclusion.
However, as argued in the introduction, one potential problem of previous work
was the lack of information about sufficiently disaggregated data. The latter is a
corner stone of our analysis. It does not only enable a more efficient identification of
the programme’s impact from larger number of observations4 but – even more impor-
tantly – enables randomization in a quasi-experiment and facilitates identification
of the causal impact of the programme on economic outcomes.5
3 Data and descriptive statistics
For the empirical analysis, we link data from several sources. Information on GDP
at purchasing power parity (PPP), total and sectoral employment,6 population,
and investment at the level of NUTS2 and NUTS3 regions stems from Cambridge
Econometrics’ Regional Database. Data on treatment under Objective 1 (and other
objectives) in the Structural Funds Programme at various levels of regional aggrega-
tion was collected from the European Commission documents concerning structural
funds.7 In part of our analysis, we use data on the size and geographical loca-
4In many of the previous studies, the number of observations and, hence, the number of treated
and untreated regions, is fairly small. This almost precludes the use of modern techniques for
program evaluation, such as our regression-discontinuity design.
5A related approach of identifying causal effects of regional policy is conducted in Criscuolo,
Martin, Overman and van Reenen (2007). They use micro level data on firms in the United
Kingdom (UK) to construct a quasi-experimental framework to identify the causal effects of the
UK’s Regional Selective Assistance programme on firm performance. They generate an instrument
for recipient status of state aid by exploiting changes in the area-specific eligibility criteria. The
eligibility criteria in the UK are determined by the European Commission’s guidelines for regional
development policies which also underly the Structural Funds Programme. The revision of regional
eligibility for structural funds before each programming period also determines the provision of
Regional Selective Assistance to firms in the UK and may therefore be used as an exogenous
instrument. The authors find a significant positive effect of state aid on investment as well as on
employment.
6Sectoral employment is used to compute sector shares of industry and services to establish
comparability of recipient and non-recipient regions.
7For each programming period, eligibility was determined by the European Commission one
year before the start of the programming period on the basis of the figures for the last three years
available at the time. Concerning the first programming period 1989-1993, see Council Regulation
number 2052/88, and Official Journal L 114, 07/05/1991 regarding the New German La¨nder. The
NUTS2 regions covered by Objective 1 in 1994-1999 are listed in Council Regulation 2081/93,
and in the Official Journal L 001, 01/01/1995 regarding the new member states Austria, Finland
and Sweden. For the last programming period 2000-2006, data stems from Council Regulation
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tion of NUTS3 regions from the Geographic Information System of the European
Commission (GISCO) to exploit spatial characteristics.
Objective 1 transfers primarily hinge upon NUTS2 regional GDP per capita
relative to the EU average and aim at fostering per-capita GDP growth in the eligible
regions. As described before, from an econometric perspective further leverage for
identification of causal effects is gained by using data at the NUTS3 level. The
reason is that NUTS3 regions that are richer than the NUTS2 than their mother
region will be receiving Objective 1 funds only because their mother region qualifies,
but would not have obtained Objective 1 funds if their own GDP per capita had
been considered. The mirror image of this concerns poor NUTS3 regions that on
their own would have qualified for Objective 1 funds, but are unlucky to be part of
a relatively rich NUTS2 mother region and thus do not obtain Objective 1 funds.
It is instructive to consider the variation in GDP per capita across both NUTS2
and NUTS3 jurisdictions within the EU. This is done in Table 2 for either level of
regional disaggregation and the year 1999 (i.e., the year prior to the last available
programming period, 2000-06).
Table 2 about here
The number of countries considered in the table is 25. Between 1986 and 1995,
the EU consisted of 12 economies as included in the programming period 1989-93.
Countries that joined the EU in 1995 (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) were included
in the EU regulations for the programming period 1994-99. Similarly, the Eastern
Enlargement of the European Union (in 2004) by 10 economies8 was incorporated in
the programming period 2000-06. Table 2 sheds light on the variation of GDP per
capita across NUTS2 and NUTS3 regions within a country, the EU12, the EU15,
and the EU25 in 1999.
We may summarize insights from that exercise as follows. According to the
formal eligibility rule, all NUTS2 regions in a country are eligible for Objective 1
transfers if the maximum GDP per capita across all regions is smaller than 75% of
the EU25 average (see fifth data column in Panel A of Table 2). For instance, this
502/1999, and from the Official Journal L 236, 23/09/2003 for the new members in 2004. All the
Regulations are available on EUR-Lex the database for European Law. In one of the sensitivity
checks, we exploit information about the actual amount of funds paid rather than a binary treat-
ment indicator alone, using information kindly provided by ESPON (European Spatial Planning
Observation Network). However, data on funds paid are not as abundant as the ones about bi-
nary treatment status. Complete coverage of NUTS3 regions is only obtained for the 1994-1999
programming period.
8Cyprus, Malta, and 8 Central and Eastern European countries: Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, Slovak Republic.
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is the case for the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) in 1999.9 On
the other hand, none of the NUTS2 regions in a country is eligible for Objective
1 transfers if the minimum GDP per capita in a region is higher than 75% of the
EU25 average. This is the case for Luxembourg, Cyprus, and Malta (all of them
cases of small countries consisting of only one NUTS2 region) as well as for Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
For the NUTS3 regions in Panel B of the table, the picture is similar to the
one for the NUTS2 regions in Panel A. However, there is more variation at the
NUTS3 level, as can be seen from the fact that the maximum GDP per capita
is higher and the minimum GDP per capita is lower for NUTS3 regions than for
their NUTS2 counterparts in most countries. Note that the maximum GDP per
capita in a country is often reached in the capital city (or the metropolitan area
around it). The corresponding NUTS2 areas are often not sub-divided into several
NUTS3 regions there, but NUTS2 and a NUTS3 region are then one and the same.
Therefore, the entries in columns 2 and 5 (country maxima) are sometimes identical
for Panels A and B but those in columns 3 and 6 are not (country minima).
Table 3 about here
Table 3 points to the advantage of using regionally more disaggregated NUTS3
data, namely (partial) randomization, as will become clear immediately. Again,
Panel A is dedicated to regional characteristics at the NUTS2 level whereas Panel B
considers the same characteristics for NUTS3 regions. Yet, rather than only looking
at moments of characteristics across regions as in Table 2, we now focus on the
difference between Objective 1 transfer recipient and non-recipient regions. Column
3 shows the difference in averages of important variables, and column 4 displays
the corresponding standard errors. It can be seen that there is more variation in
GDP per capita between Objective 1 treated and untreated regions at the NUTS3
level. We discussed above that partial randomization of Objective 1 status at the
NUTS3 level is established by the fact that eligibility is defined at the NUTS2 level
but NUTS3 regions within a NUTS2 mother region are heterogenous in their GDP
per capita. The associated randomization is not perfect, however: the probability
of being treated under Objective 1 is still higher for NUTS3 regions with a GDP
per capita below the EU’s 75% threshold than for regions above the threshold.10
9Of course, Objective 1 transfer eligibility of the Baltic countries became only relevant after
their EU membership in 2004.
10In other words, a NUTS3 region with a GDP per capita below the 75% threshold is more likely
to be part of a NUTS2 region with per-capita income below the 75% threshold than to be part of
a NUTS2 region with per-capita income above the 75% threshold.
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Since we wish to infer causal effects of Objective 1 treatment on EU regions across
different periods, we report summary statistics for the EU12, EU15 and EU25 in
the three programming periods 1989-93, 1994-99, and 2000-06.
The most prominent source of differences between the average Objective 1 re-
cipient and non-recipient region is their GDP per capita. The reduction of this gap
is the prime target of Objective 1 transfers. Not surprisingly, the average difference
in per-capita GDP between Objective 1 and non-Objective 1 regions in column 3
increases as further countries join the EU over the course of the three programming
periods. In 1988, for the EU12, the average NUTS2 recipient region had a per-capita
GDP that was 64 percent of the average non-recipient region. In 1999, for the EU25,
the average recipient region had a per-capita GDP that was 53 percent of the average
non-recipient region. But GDP per capita is not the only difference between treated
and untreated regions. Similar trends arise for other characteristics. Regions differ
systematically also in their employment shares, their population densities, and their
sector distributions. These differences occur at both the NUTS2 and the NUTS3
level.
An unconditional comparison of the economic performance of some of the poor-
est (Objective 1) and least developed regions to that of the richest (non-Objective 1)
regions thus seems like comparing apples to oranges. Also multivariate regressions in
the sense of conditional mean comparisons do not necessarily achieve a better com-
parability. Angrist (1998) argues that one may achieve comparability and, hence,
reproduce a (quasi-)natural experiment by estimating a fully saturated model which
includes exclusively indicator variables on the right-hand side of the model. With
continuous regressors as in Panel A of Table 3, this would require interacting each
level a regressor may take with those of all other regressors. Obviously, the fully
saturated model cannot be estimated with continuous explanatory variables. Com-
parability between funded and non-funded regions may, however, be achieved when
restricting the analysis to regions within a small interval around the 75% per-capita
GDP threshold.
4 Regression analysis
We seek to estimate the causal effect of EU structural funds recipience on regional
economic performance. Ideally, in an experimental setting, we would randomly as-
sign regions to a treatment and control group, i.e., give structural funds to some
randomly selected regions and compare their economic outcomes to those of ran-
domly selected control regions. While such an ideal experiment is not possible, the
EU criteria for assigning Objective 1 status have quasi-experimental features.
9
The regression-discontinuity design (RDD) The discontinuous jump at the
75% cutoff gives rise to a regression discontinuity design (RDD). Think of a NUTS2
region A with a GDP per capita of 74.99% and a NUTS2 region B with a GDP per
capita of 75.01%, one eligible, one not. These two regions are likely to be more com-
parable than regions far away from the threshold. Ideally, with many observations
very close to the threshold, and with full compliance with the EU’s threshold rule,
a sharp regression discontinuity design arises: on average, regions to the left and
the right of the threshold do not systematically differ in their characteristics except
that those to the left of the 75% threshold receive EU structural funds and those
to the right do not. In a neighborhood of the threshold for selection, a sharp RDD
presents some features of a pure experiment (see Trochim 1984 as well as Angrist
and Pischke 2009 for a general discussion of the methodology). The comparison of
mean outcomes for participants and non-participants at the margin allows to control
for confounding factors and identifies the mean impact of the intervention locally at
the threshold for selection.
The sharp RDD features two main limitations: first, assignment to treatment
must depend only on observable pre-intervention variables. Second, identification of
the mean treatment effect is possible only at the threshold for selection. The second
limitation represents a natural trade-off. The benefit of reliable causal estimates
comes at the cost of being valid only in a limited value range. The first condition is
unlikely to be met in the context of assignment to Objective 1 status. The reason
is EU power politics.
Column (1) of Table 4 shows that several NUTS2 regions that are ineligible
according to the 75% rule nevertheless obtain Objective 1 status. These exceptions
are the result of bargaining between delegates of the respective EU member countries
and representatives of the European Commission. Conversely, as can be seen from
column (2), (nearly) all NUTS2 regions below the 75% threshold – except for two
British NUTS2 regions11 – do receive Objective 1 status.
An alternative representation of this information is given in Figure 2. Note that
the solid lines in Figure 2 mark the fraction of NUTS2 regions that obtain Objective
1 funds.12 To the left of the 75% GDP per capita threshold this fraction is approx-
imately one. Thus, no national government voluntarily foregoes the possibility to
collect EU structural funds for regions which are formally eligible. The existence
of Objective 1 treated NUTS2 regions which are formally ineligible and situated to
the right of the threshold – as the result of bargaining – gives rise to a so-called
fuzzy RDD. Hence, there is imperfect compliance with the assignment rule at the
11The reason for this exception is that Britain did not collect data at the NUTS2 level at the
time. At the NUTS1 level, these two British NUTS2 regions did not qualify for Objective 1 status.
12This fraction is computed for 5-percentage point intervals.
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threshold.
The dotted lines in Figure 2 represent the fractions of NUTS3 regions that re-
ceived Objective 1 transfers for each level of GDP per capita. Since eligibility for
Objective 1 status is determined at the NUTS2 level and there is some heterogene-
ity of NUTS3 regions within NUTS2 regions, the 75% threshold is less sharp at the
NUTS3 level. To see why this is the case, think of two equally sized NUTS2 regions
A and B, the first having a per-capita GDP equal to 74% of the EU average and the
second having a per-capita GDP equal to 76% of the EU average. Whereas region A
qualifies for Objective 1 funds, region B does not. Now, imagine that both NUTS2
regions have two equally sized NUTS3 daughter regions: NUTS2 region A hosting
one NUTS3 daughter region (A1) with 72% and one (A2) with 76% and NUTS2
region B hosting one NUTS3 daughter (B1) region with 74% and one (B2) with 78%
of the EU average per-capita GDP. From a NUTS3 perspective, half of the NUTS3
regions to the left of the 75% threshold receive Objective 1 transfers (A1, but not
B1) and the same to the right of the 75% threshold (A2 receives money, B2 not).
This example illustrates an interesting feature: from a NUTS3 level perspective,
Objective 1 status is partially decoupled from NUTS3 level GDP per capita. NUTS3
region A2 receives Objective 1 funds whereas NUTS3 region B1 does not, although
region A2’s per-capita GDP (76% of EU average) is larger than that of region B1
(74%). Thus, A2 receives EU funds although it would not have qualified on the basis
of its own income level. Conversely, B1 does not receive Objective 1 funds, although
it would have qualified on the basis of its own GDP per capita. Put differently, some
rich NUTS3 regions located within poor NUTS2 regions receive EU funds, whereas
some poor NUTS3 regions located within rich NUTS2 regions receive no EU funds.
Econometrically speaking, within some interval around the Objective 1 thresh-
old, recipience of EU structural fund status is thus – to some extent – randomly
assigned from the perspective of NUTS3 regions. As indicated before, random as-
signment is not perfect because poor NUTS2 regions have, on average, poor daughter
regions. As a consequence, the dotted curve in Figure 2 is flatter (attesting to the
partial randomness) than the thick curve but it is not horizontal either, as would be
the case if Objective 1 status were perfectly randomly assigned. Columns (3) and
(4) in Table 4 show the (actual) Objective 1 status of NUTS3 regions compared to
their (hypothetical) eligibility if the 75% rule were applied to their own per-capita
GDP.
Still, within a small band around the 75% threshold the probability of a NUTS3
region to obtain Objective 1 status is relatively close on both sides of the threshold.
For instance, in the 2000-2006 programming period (third panel of Figure 2) the
probability of qualifying as Objective 1 equals 0.35 for NUTS3 regions whose GDP
per capita lies between 70% and 75% of the EU average and equals 0.26 for NUTS3
11
regions whose GDP per capita lies between 75% and 80% of the EU average.
By restricting our analysis to the 70-80% interval, we can ensure a large degree
of comparability between treated and control regions. Taking a NUTS3 perspective
has the additional benefits of yielding a larger estimation sample and the (partial)
random assignment of Objective 1 status illustrated above. In the regression anal-
ysis, we further control for remaining differences in observable characteristics to
eliminate a possible bias of the treatment effect estimates due to the omission of
other determinants of economic outcome.
We estimate the following regression equation where gi,t is the average annual
growth rate of GDP per capita or, alternatively, employment over the respective
period t. The coefficient we are interested in measures the effect of a dummy vari-
able for Objective 1 status (Treati,t) on outcome. Other covariates we control for
in the initial period are included in vector Xi,t. We pool the data for the last
three programming periods which lasted 5,6, and 7 years respectively. In various
specifications we include time-fixed effects as well as region-fixed effects.
gi,t = α + βTreati,t + Xi,tγ + ui,t (1)
gi,t =
1
pt
ln
(
yi,t
yi,t−pt
)
(2)
for t = {1993, 1999, 2006} and pt =

5 if t = 1993
6 if t = 1999
7 if t = 2006

where yi,t and yi,t−pt measure per-capita GDP (at PPP) and employment in periods
t and t− pt, respectively.
Estimation results Tables 5 and 6 start with bivariate regressions of per-capita
GDP growth on the full estimation sample, showing raw differences in growth rates
between treated and control regions. While column (1) reports results from a pooled
OLS regression, column (2) applies an estimator with fixed region-specific effects.
Both the pooled OLS and the fixed effects estimator control for time-fixed effects.
Columns (3) and (4) show results from multivariate regressions, using several control
variables: the population growth rate, the beginning-of-period employment share,
the service share, the industry share, the investment rate, the population density
as well as EU12 and EU15 membership dummies. The latter, being time-constant
indicators, drop out in the estimations that use region-fixed effects. The variation
primarily exploited for identifying causal effects of Objective 1 treatment in the
difference-in-difference regression discontinuity design (DID-RDD) is the one across
regions that changed their Objective 1 status over the periods considered. Those
regions are highlighted in Figure 3.
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Figure 3 about here
Tables 5 and 6 about here
Either regression points to statistically significant GDP per capita growth dif-
ferences between treated and control regions in Table 5. The fixed effects estimates
differ starkly from their pooled OLS counterparts and a Hausman test rejects the
latter against the former estimates. Columns (1) to (4) compare the GDP per capita
growth of the average Objective 1 treated NUTS3 region to the average untreated
one in the average programming period. We know that some of the treated as well
as some of the untreated regions may be very distant from the 75% threshold in
GDP per capita space relative to the respective EU average.
Columns (5) to (7) restrict the sample to a certain window around the threshold,
always employing fixed NUTS3-region effects, fixed time effects, and the covariates
as in column (4). As mentioned before, we would expect the quality of identification
of causal effects to rise as the window size declines. Hence, we would prefer the
window which includes NUTS3 regions with a GDP per capita between 70% and
80% of the respective EU average. This strategy reduces the number of observations
to less than one-seventh of the original sample. However, the DID-RDD average
treatment effect estimate in column (5) is fairly close to the simple difference-in-
difference average treatment effect in column (4) and the same holds true for larger
window sizes (65-85% and 60-90%). Hence, we conclude from this that the degree
of randomization obtained from using NUTS3 regional data together with regional
and time fixed effects and covariates practically eliminates the endogeneity bias of
the impact of Objective 1 treatment status on outcome such as GDP per capita or
employment growth.
Since part of the funds are used as employment subsidies one might also expect
a positive effect of Objective 1 treatment on employment growth. However, as the
first column of Table 6 shows, the simple correlation between Objective 1 treatment
and employment growth is even negative. This result is probably due to an omitted
variables bias. After including the control variables we find a positive effect of
Objective 1 treatment on employment growth. Yet, this result is not robust. As is
shown in columns (5)-(6) of Table 6 there is no significant effect in any of the time
windows considered.
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5 Sensitivity checks, extensions, and quantifica-
tion of the effects
The average treatment effects reported in Tables 5 and 6 are our reference estimates
and point to a positive GDP growth effect, but no employment growth effect of
Objective 1 transfers.
In this section, we consider several sensitivity checks and extensions to probe
the robustness of this finding. First, we ask whether the effect of Objective 1 trans-
fers varies across programming periods. Second, we check whether and to which
extent the estimated treatment effect is downward biased due to spillover effects of
Objective 1 transfers – associated with the public goods character of infrastructure
investments – across NUTS3 regional borders. The latter may lead to a downward
bias of the estimated effects. Third, there may be some residual systematic differ-
ence between treated and untreated regions with regard to the observable variables
considered. While the difference in per capita GDP is eliminated by the DID-RDD,
this is not necessarily the case for the other observables. An instrumental variables
strategy helps to remove the potentially remaining bias. Fourth, in the preceding
analysis we have focused on a binary treatment indicator. The amount of Objec-
tive 1 transfers differs across recipient regions, however. Dose-response function
estimation allows us to assess how Objective 1 regions respond to variations in the
treatment intensity.13
Apart from these robustness checks, this section also provides a cost-benefit
analysis of the EU Objective 1 program.
Estimates for individual programming periods In the previous analysis, the
parameter estimates were obtained after pooling the data across all three program-
ming periods. It may be the case that the treatment effect differs across periods.
We shed light on this question in Tables 7 and 8, where we consider the impact of
Objective 1 status in programme-period-specific regressions. Of course, a limitation
of such an analysis is that we cannot include region-specific fixed effects. The results
could thus be biased due to omitted relevant, time-invariant (e.g., region-specific)
variables. Hence, the results from the period-specific models should be interpreted
with caution.
Tables 7 and 8 about here
13The latter cold not be done throughout our analysis, because of the limited availability of
continuous information about Objective 1 transfers.
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The results in Table 7 suggest that per-capita GDP growth – the main target
of Objective 1 – is quite similarly affected by Objective 1 treatment across the
three periods. This is not the case for employment growth, according to Table 8.
Positive employment effects which are significantly different from zero are found in
the last programming period, but neither before that nor on average. Taken together
with the results from the fixed-effects estimation in the previous section, we should
probably be more cautious about the estimated employment effects as compared to
the impact of Objective 1 treatment on GDP per capita growth.
Avoiding a downward bias of the treatment effects from cross-border
spillovers One concern with the estimates in the previous tables is that Objective
1 transfers may be used to finance public infrastructure, generating not only local
effects on the treated regions but also spillover effects to neighboring regions. The
latter would violate the so-called stable unit treatment value assumption and lead
to downward-biased estimates of the average Objective 1 treatment effect.
Provided that the aforementioned spillovers are of medium reach, such a bias
can be avoided by the following procedure. We assume that Objective 1 transfers
mainly affect regions within a radius of 200 kilometers but not farther than that. We
exclude all untreated control regions that are located within a 200-kilometer-radius
from any treated region.
Tables 9 and 10 about here
Tables 9 and 10 show the results from this particular estimation sample (labeled
spatial control exclusion mechanism) for the two outcomes: per-capita GDP growth
and employment growth. Columns (1) and (2) impose no restriction with respect
to per-capita GDP, whereas columns (3)-(5) restrict the sample to regions close to
the 75% threshold. It turns out that the point estimates of Objective 1 treatment
effects are somewhat higher than those in the main Tables 5 and 6. This is consis-
tent with moderate cross-border spillover effects of Objective 1 treatment. Ignoring
cross-border spillovers leads to slightly downward biased Objective 1 treatment ef-
fect estimates because the per-capita income or employment growth in some of the
control regions is positively affected. However, with respect to employment growth
the treatment effects remain insignificant in all interval specifications.
Eliminating the bias from further observable differences between treated
and untreated regions So far, we have tried to account for differences between
treated and control regions by restricting estimation to a tight interval around the
75% per-capita GDP threshold and by allowing other observable sources of hetero-
geneity to enter linearly in the regressions. However, we may allow for a further
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non-linear impact of these observables by applying a two-stage procedure that im-
proves the comparability of treated and untreated regions within the 70-80% interval
as suggested by Van der Klaauw (2002) and Battistin and Rettore (2008).
In the first stage, we estimate the probability of Objective 1 treatment by a
propensity score function:
E[Ii|Si] = f(Si) + γ1[Si ≥ S¯] (3)
where f(Si) is a continuous function of S and [Si ≥ S¯] is a dummy variable that
is set to unity, if a region’s GDP per capita is below the 75% threshold. We do
so for each programming period separately so that we may omit the time index in
equation (3).
In the second stage, the economic outcome of interest in the same programming
period is modeled as a function of treatment Ii instrumented by the first stage esti-
mate of E[Ii|Si] = Prob[Ii = 1|Si]. Note that both the first stage probit regression
as well as the second stage regression include only observations within the 70-80%
GDP-per-capita interval. We pool the data in the second stage and again include
region and time fixed effects. This procedure should provide the best possible com-
parison of treated and untreated observations around the 75% threshold.
The results for this estimation are shown in Table 11. The first three columns
report the first stage probit regressions that serve to predict our instrument of
Objective 1 status. The first period data set consists only of EU12 members, hence,
the EU12 and EU15 dummies are removed. In the second period there are EU12 as
well as EU15 members. However, the dummies are removed as well because none of
the countries joining the EU in 1994 qualified for Objective 1 status.
With regard to GDP-per-capita growth, a significant positive effect of Objective
1 treatment shows up. It amounts to 2.6% which is in line with our results for the
sharp regression discontinuity design. Note that the 95% confidence interval ranges
from 0.66% to 4.4%. With respect to employment growth, no significant effects are
found, as before.
Estimating the effect of marginal changes in Objective 1 transfers: dose-
response function estimation In a final assessment, we consider continuous
Objective 1 transfers and estimate their effects on outcome. Binary indicators of
Objective 1 recipient status may conceal varying effects of different magnitudes of
EU transfers. We consider Objective 1 funds as a fraction of GDP as the continuous
treatment variable. However, information on continuous transfers at the NUTS3
level of aggregation is only available for the programming period 1994-99. So, un-
like with binary Objective 1 transfer recipient status, we may not entertain the
advantages of region-fixed effects estimation.
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Hirano and Imbens (2004) derive an extension of the Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) propensity-score method to estimate the average local effects of continuous
treatments. We discuss this relatively recent method, known as generalized propen-
sity score matching, in Appendix A. The estimates from generalized propensity score
matching are typically reported with a so-called dose-response function. In our case,
the dose-response function depicts the growth rate over a programming period as a
function of EU transfers relative to GDP. Figure 4 plots the dose-response function
(left panel) as well as the treatment effect function for the central programming
period, 1994-99.
The dose-response function indicates that at low values of the treatment (Ob-
jective 1 transfer volumes that are small relative to a region’s GDP) regions grow
at around 3 percent per year, similar to regions without Objective 1 status. An
increase in Objective 1 transfers leads to a more-than-proportionate increase in per
capita growth until a level of transfers of 1.25% of the recipient region’s GDP is
reached. Beyond that value, the marginal effect of further transfers declines. That
is also evidenced by the treatment effect function (the derivative of the dose-response
function) where confidence bands include a zero additional growth effect for transfer-
to-GDP ratios above 1.25 percent. These results point to the possibility of leakage
effects if transfers are exceeding a certain value.
Assessing the effectiveness of Objective 1 treatment With the estimates
at hand, we may easily infer whether the use of Objective 1 transfers is justified
on average or not, when requiring effectiveness within a programming period. Let
us consider the estimates about the impact of (binary) Objective 1 treatment for
the 70-80% interval in Tables 5 and 6 as a benchmark. According to those tables,
Objective 1 participation only generates effects only on GDP per capita growth but
not employment, at least not within the same programming period as Objective 1
participation occurs.
Objective 1 treatment led to average per-capita-GDP growth effects of approx-
imately 1.8 percentage points in recipient regions.14 The level of GDP per capita
and GDP (at PPP), in the average treated region and year amounted to 11, 016
Euro and 3, 872 million Euros, respectively.15 The average Objective 1 region’s pop-
ulation changed only slightly over the average period with a growth rate of −0.13
percent. Hence, Objective 1 treatment caused absolute GDP to change by about
14Note that the semi-logarithmic equations we estimate would actually require a slight trans-
formation of the estimated coefficients following Van Garderen and Shah (2002). However, in our
case, the associated difference is small.
15Taking GDP and GDP per capita at the beginning of each single programming period, i.e., in
1988, 1993, and 1999.
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the same rate as per-capita GDP, namely 1.8% or 69.70 million Euros (at PPP) per
year in the average treated region and programming period. Aggregating this effect
up for all treated regions in the average programming period results in a treatment
effect of 24.05 billion Euros (at PPP) per year within the EU as a whole.16 The
total cost of the Objective 1 programme was 19.80 billion Euro (at PPP) per year
in the average programming period (see Table 1).17 Then, we may conclude that
the Objective 1 programme induces a net effect of 4.25 billion Euros (at PPP) per
year or 121 percent of the expenses per year in the EU as a whole. In other words,
every Euro spent on Objective 1 transfers leads to 1.21 EUR of additional GDP.
These calculations are well in line with the dose-response function estimates,
where we observe a more-than-proportionate increase in per-capita GDP growth in
the lower range of Objective 1 funds per GDP (up to transfers of around 1.25% of
the recipient region’s GDP). Since the majority of Objective 1 regions is in that
range, the more-than-proportionate increase in the lower range dominates the less-
than-proportionate treatment effect in the upper range of transfer-to-GDP ratios.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper considers the estimation of causal effects of the European Union’s (EU)
Objective 1 transfers on economic growth, the major objective in the EU’s Struc-
tural Funds Programme, which aims at facilitating convergence and cohesion within
the EU. Objective 1 funds target fairly large, sub-national regional aggregates – re-
ferred to as NUTS2 regions – to foster growth in regions, whose per-capita GDP in
purchasing power parity is lower than 75% of the EU’s average per-capita income.
We use panel data at a fairly disaggregated regional level – referred to as NUTS3 –
to exploit variation in per-capita GDP within NUTS2 aggregates for which Objective
1 transfer eligibility is determined. This alone leads to a partial randomization of
treatment status. We then employ a regression discontinuity design – considering
only comparable regions within a fairly narrow window around the 75% threshold –
to identify the causal effect of Objective 1 treatment on per-capita income growth,
using NUTS3 regional data.
16There were 286 treated regions in the first, 309 in the second, and 417 treated regions in the
third programming period. The first period lasted 5, the second 6, and the most recent one 7 years.
Hence, on average 345 NUTS3 regions received Objective 1 transfers over the 18 year-period under
consideration.
17A crucial assumption for this cost assessment is that the associated collection of taxes did not
distort economic activity in net paying regions. Hence, we assume that one Euro of Objective 1
transfers is identical to one Euro of costs. However, for a violation of this assumption, one would
have to blame the taxing authorities at the national level rather than the European Commission.
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Our results suggest the following conclusions. First, Objective 1 transfers exert
a robust positive effect on GDP per capita growth. On average, Objective 1 status
raises per-capita income by about 1.8% relative to comparable regions. Second,
different from the positive effects on per-capita GDP, we do not find significant
employment effects during the period in which transfers are allocated. There may
be various reasons for that. One reason could be that Objective 1 transfers mainly
stimulate investment. Another reason could be that the creation of jobs takes longer
than the duration of a programming period of five to seven years.
According to conservative benchmark estimates, every Euro spent on Objective
1 transfers leads to 1.21 EUR of additional GDP. Hence, our analysis shows that
Objective 1 transfers under the EU’s Structural Funds Programme are not only
effective but also cost-efficient.
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A Generalized propensity scores
Index a sample of regions with i = 1, . . . , N and consider the unit-level dose-response
function of outcomes Yi(τ) as a function of treatments τ ∈ T . In the binary
treatment case T = {0, 1}. In the continuous case, we allow T to be an interval
[τ0, τ1]. We restrict τ0 > 0 to study the range of transfers (as fraction of GDP) that
we used to summarize with a treatment indicator of one and in order to exclude
the probability mass at zero treatment in accordance with the Hirano and Imbens
approach. We are interested in the average dose-response function across all regions
i, µ(τ) = E[Yi(τ)]. We observe the vector Xi, the treatment Ti, and the outcome
corresponding to the level of treatment received, Yi = Yi(Ti). We drop the index i
for simplicity and assume that Y (τ)τ∈T , T,X are defined on a common probability
space, that τ is continuously distributed with respect to a Lebesgue measure on T ,
and that Y = Y (T ) is a well defined random variable.
In this setting, the definition of unconfoundedness for binary treatments gener-
alizes to weak unconfoundedness for continuous treatments
Y (τ) ⊥ T |X for all τ ∈ T . (4)
Regions differ in their characteristics x so that they are more or less likely to re-
ceive Objective 1 funds. The weak unconfoundedness assumption says that, after
controlling for observable characteristics X, any remaining difference in Objective 1
transfers T across regions is independent of the potential outcomes Y (τ). Assump-
tion (4) is called weak unconfoundedness because it does not require joint indepen-
dence of all potential outcomes, Y (τ)τ∈[τ0,τ1], T,X. Instead, it requires conditional
independence to hold at every treatment level.
Hirano and Imbens (2004) define the generalized propensity score as
R = r(T,X), (5)
where r(τ, x) = fT |X(τ |x) is the conditional density of the treatment given the co-
variates. The generalized propensity score is assumed to have a balancing property
similar to that of the conventional propensity score under binary treatment: within
strata with the same value of r(τ,X), the probability that T = τ does not depend
on the value of X. In other words, when looking at two regions with the same proba-
bility (conditional on observable characteristics X) of being exposed to a particular
EU transfer, their treatment level is independent of X. That is, the generalized
propensity score summarizes all information in the multi-dimensional vector X so
that
X ⊥ 1{T = τ}|r(τ,X).
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This is a mechanical property of the generalized propensity score, and does not
require unconfoundedness. In combination with unconfoundedness, the balancing
property implies that assignment to treatment is weakly unconfounded given the
generalized propensity score (see Hirano and Imbens 2004 for a proof): if assignment
to the treatment is weakly unconfounded given pre-treatment variables X, then
fT (τ |r(τ,X), y(T )) = fT (τ |r(τ,X)) (6)
for every τ . This result says that we can evaluate the generalized propensity score
at a given treatment level by considering the conditional density of the respective
treatment level τ . In that sense we use as many propensity scores as there are
treatment levels, but never more than a single score at one treatment level.
We eliminate biases associated with differences in the covariates in two steps (for
a proof that the procedure removes bias, see Hirano and Imbens 2004):
1. Estimate the conditional expectation of the outcome as a function of two
scalar variables, the treatment level T and the generalized propensity score R,
β(τ, r) = E[y|T = τ, R = r]
2. Estimate the dose-response function at a particular level of the treatment by
averaging this conditional expectation over the generalized propensity score at
that particular level of the treatment, µ(τ) = E[β(τ, r(τ,X))].
It is important to note that, in the second step, we do not average over the gener-
alized propensity score R = r(τ,X); rather we average over the score evaluated at
the treatment level of interest, r(τ,X). In other words, we fix τ and average over
Xi and r(τ,Xi) ∀i.
21
References
Angrist, Joshua D., “Estimating the Labor Market Impact of Voluntary Military Service
Using Social Security Data on Military Applicants,” Econometrica, March 1998, 66 (2),
249–288.
and Jo¨rn-Steffen Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Com-
panion., Princeton University Press, 2009.
Battistin, Erich and Enrico Rettore, “Ineligibles and Eligible Non-Participants as a
Double Comparison Group in Regression Discontinuity Designs,” Journal of Economet-
rics, 2008, 142, 715–730.
Beugelsdijk, Maaike and Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, “The Effectiveness of Structural
Policy in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis for the EU-15 in 1995-2001,”
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2005, 43, 37–51.
Boldrin, Michele and Fabio Canova, “Europe’s Regions - Income Disparities and
Regional Policies,” Economic Policy, 2001, pp. 207–253.
Cappelen, Aadne, Fulvio Castellacci, Jan Fagerberg, and Bart Verspagen, “The
Impact of EU Regional Support on Growth and Convergence in the European Union,”
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2003, 41, 621–644.
Criscuolo, Chiara, Ralf Martin, Henry G. Overman, and John van Reenen,
“The Effect of Industrial Policy on Corporate Performance: Evidence from Panel Data,”
2007, Working Paper LSE.
Dall’erba, Sandy and Julie Le Gallo, “Regional Convergence and the Impact of
Structural Funds over 1989-1999: a Spatial Econometric Analysis,” Papers in Regional
Science, 2008. forthcoming.
Ederveen, Sjef, Henri L.F. de Groot, and Richard Nahuis, “Fertile Soil for Struc-
tural Funds? A Panel Data Analysis of the Conditional Effectiveness of European
Cohesion Policy,” Kyklos, 2006, 59, 17–42.
, Joeri Gorter, Ruud de Mooij, and Richard Nahuis, Funds and Games: The
Economics of European Cohesion Policy, CPB & Koninklijke De Swart, 2002.
European, Commission, “Regional Development Studies - The Impact of Structural
Policies on Economic and Social Cohesion in the Union 1989-99,” Office for Official
Publications of the European Commission, Luxembourg 1997.
, “Unity, Solidarity, Diversity for Europe, its People and its Territory - Second Report
on Economic and Social Cohesion,” Office for Official Publications of the European
Commission, Luxembourg 2001.
22
, “Annex to the 18th Annual Report on Implementation of the Structural Funds (2006),”
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 2007.
Hirano, Keisuke and Guido W. Imbens, “The Propensity Score with Continuous
Treatments,” in Andrew Gelman and Xiao-Li Meng, eds., Applied Bayesian Modeling
and Causal Inference from Incomplete-Data Perspectives, Wiley Series in Probability
and Statistics, Chichester: Wiley, 2004.
Ma, Jun, “Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Nine Countries: Lessons for Developing
Countries,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 1997, No. 1822.
Midelfart-Knarvik, Karen H. and Henry G. Overman, “Delocation and European
Integration- Is Structural Spending Justified?,” Economic Policy, 2002, 17, 323–359.
Rosenbaum, Paul R. and Donald B. Rubin, “Central Role of the Propensity Score
in Observational Studies for Causal Effects,” Biometrika, 1983, 70, 41–55.
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, “Regional Cohesion: Evidence and Theories of Regional Growth
and Convergence,” European Economic Review, 1996, 40, 1325–1352.
Trochim, William M., Research Design for Program Evaluation: The Regression-
Discontinuity Approach, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1984.
Van der Klaauw, Wilbert, “Estimating the Effect of Financial Aid Offers on College
Enrollment: a Regression-Discontinuity Approach,” International Economic Review,
2002, 43.
Van Garderen, Kees J. and Chandra Shah, “Exact Interpretation of Dummy Vari-
ables in Semilogarithmic Equations,” Econometrics Journal, 2002, 5, 149–159.
23
B Tables and Figures
Table 1: Funds spent on Objective 1 regions
1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006
EU12 EU15 EU25
NUTS2
Total number of NUTS2 regions 193 215 285
Number of Obj. 1 NUTS2 regions 58 64 129
NUTS3
Total number of NUTS3 regions 1015 1091 1213
Number of Obj. 1 NUTS3 regions 286 309 417
Overall yearly funds (Mio. Euro) 8763.600 15661.670 23144.020
Overall yearly funds (Mio. Euro PPP) 11343.254 17731.411 27626.010
Yearly funds as fraction of Obj. 1 region GDP .012 .015 .015
Yearly funds per inhabitant of Obj. 1 region (Euro) 100 165 146
Notes: Data on EU Structural Funds stem from European Commission (1997 p.154-155 and 2007 p.202). To obtain
average yearly funds we divide period-specific figures by the number of years the respective programming period
lasted. We calculate the funds in PPP terms by weighting the funds each single country received in the respective
programming period with the country’s Purchasing Power Parity Index of the programming period’s initial year.
Funds per GDP and funds per inhabitant are calculated as the average yearly funds divided by regional GDP and
regional population, respectively at the begin of the programming period. This is 1989 for the first, 1994 for the
second, and 2000 for the third programming period.
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Table 2: Disparities in the EU25 1999 (GDP per capita)
Country Avg. Country Max Country Min Country Avg. Country Max Country Min
(Euro PPP) (Euro PPP) (Euro PPP) rel. to EU25 rel. to EU25 rel. to EU25
Panel A: NUTS2 level
Austria 18855.38 29546.84 13446.46 1.02 1.59 .72
Belgium 18466.26 43347.16 14331.10 .99 2.34 .77
Cyprus 15040.00 15040.00 15040.00 .81 .81 .81
Czech Republic 11411.80 23708.24 9554.07 .61 1.28 .51
Germany 19929.09 35739.29 12738.76 1.07 1.93 .69
Denmark 22634.88 27954.49 17869.64 1.22 1.51 .96
Estonia 6252.50 10644.65 4636.73 .34 .57 .25
Spain 16005.10 22823.61 11146.41 .86 1.23 .60
Finland 20302.39 28662.20 15392.66 1.09 1.54 .83
France 19790.04 32908.45 16100.37 1.07 1.77 .87
Greece 12530.61 16631.15 9377.14 .68 .90 .51
Hungary 8598.66 14861.88 6192.45 .46 .80 .33
Ireland 21651.46 24769.80 16454.23 1.17 1.33 .89
Italy 21184.88 29900.69 12915.68 1.14 1.61 .70
Lithuania 6243.72 9153.68 4171.41 .34 .49 .22
Luxembourg 41111.00 41111.00 41111.00 2.22 2.22 2.22
Latvia 5296.85 10829.71 3191.77 .29 .58 .17
Malta 14751.00 14751.00 14751.00 .79 .79 .79
Netherland 22107.05 29016.06 16808.08 1.19 1.56 .91
Poland 8382.42 13092.61 6015.52 .45 .71 .32
Portugal 13250.58 21408.19 12207.97 .71 1.15 .66
Sweden 19942.22 30431.47 18754.28 1.07 1.64 1.01
Slovenia 12438.66 19182.09 9761.78 .67 1.03 .53
Slovak Republic 8824.24 18931.21 6546.31 .48 1.02 .35
United Kingdom 19392.81 49362.68 12384.90 1.04 2.66 .67
Panel B: NUTS3 level
Austria 17735.97 29546.84 11558.47 .96 1.59 .62
Belgium 17466.13 43347.16 9196.50 .94 2.34 .50
Cyprus 15040.00 15040.00 15040.00 .81 .81 .81
Czech Republic 11368.54 23708.24 9505.94 .61 1.28 .51
Germany 19383.22 59233.63 9518.86 1.04 3.19 .51
Denmark 22029.58 36353.23 16356.74 1.19 1.96 .88
Estonia 6252.50 10644.65 4636.73 .34 .57 .25
Spain 16042.51 24063.16 10542.56 .86 1.30 .57
Finland 18645.21 28949.18 14581.10 1.00 1.56 .79
France 18813.59 60237.51 13404.89 1.01 3.25 .72
Greece 12158.81 27390.63 7790.99 .66 1.48 .42
Hungary 8378.10 18758.00 5239.88 .45 1.01 .28
Ireland 20338.09 30179.18 15950.16 1.10 1.63 .86
Italy 20266.30 33351.66 11364.21 1.09 1.80 .61
Lithuania 6243.72 9153.68 4171.41 .34 .49 .22
Luxembourg 41111.00 41111.00 41111.00 2.22 2.22 2.22
Latvia 5296.85 10829.71 3191.77 .29 .58 .17
Malta 14751.00 14751.00 14751.00 .79 .79 .79
Netherland 20888.92 34469.48 13887.72 1.13 1.86 .75
Poland 8093.41 24305.55 4948.30 .44 1.31 .27
Portugal 12319.29 24791.92 7108.58 .66 1.34 .38
Sweden 19653.05 30431.47 17096.12 1.06 1.64 .92
Slovenia 12438.66 19182.09 9761.78 .67 1.03 .53
Slovak Republic 8903.64 18931.21 5296.31 .48 1.02 .29
United Kingdom 19459.71 89296.20 10416.94 1.05 4.81 .56
Notes: Panel A shows average, maximum and minimum GDP per capita (PPP terms) within country for NUTS2
regions. Panel B shows average, maximum and minimum GDP per capita within country for NUTS3 regions.
Table 3: Characteristics of Obj. 1 recipient vs. non-recipient regions
Panel A: NUTS2 level
Mean Mean Difference Std. Err.
recipient non-recipient col.(1)-col.(2) of col.(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU12
GDP per capita 1988 8653.82 13612.51 -4958.69 478.44
Employment share 1988 .37 .44 -.06 .01
Population density 1988 .36 .44 -.08 .15
Industry share 1988 .16 .25 -.09 .01
Service share 1988 .28 .37 -.09 .01
No. of observations 52 135
EU15
GDP per capita 1993 10795.99 16310.49 -5514.51 541.80
Employment share 1993 .37 .44 -.07 .01
Population density 1993 .37 .42 -.04 .15
Industry share 1993 .16 .22 -.06 .01
Service share 1993 .31 .38 -.07 .01
No. of observations 58 151
EU25
GDP per capita 1999 11159.71 21255.49 -10095.79 557.01
Employment share 1999 .39 .46 -.07 .008
Population denisty 1999 .22 .46 -.23 .10
Industry share 1999 .23 .19 .04 .01
Service share 1999 .36 .40 -.04 .01
No. of observations 123 156
Panel B: NUTS3 level
Mean Mean Difference Std. Err.
recipient non-recipient col.(1)-col.(2) of col.(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU12
GDP per capita 1988 7799.97 13593.50 -5793.53 301.91
Employment share 1988 .39 .44 -.05 .009
Population density 1988 .27 .60 -.33 .08
Industry share 1988 .26 .35 -.09 .007
Service share 1988 .56 .59 -.03 .009
No. of observations 280 729
EU15
GDP per capita 1993 10204.29 16129.33 -5925.04 325.83
Employment share 1993 .38 .44 -.06 .008
Population density 1993 .29 .57 -.28 .07
Industry share 1993 .26 .32 -.06 .007
Service share 1993 .60 .63 -.02 .008
No. of observations 303 782
EU25
GDP per capita 1999 12148.56 20591.74 -8443.19 377.93
Employment share 1999 .39 .45 -.07 .007
Population density 1999 .27 .58 -.31 .06
Industry share 1999 .28 .29 -.004 .006
Service share 1999 .58 .67 -.09 .006
No. of observations 411 796
Notes: Panel A (Panel B) shows differences in characteristics of recipient and non-recipient regions at the NUTS2
(NUTS3) level. We miss information on the four French overseas-departe´ments and the two autonomous Portuguese
regions Madeira and Azores for all three years. Each of them makes up a NUTS2 as well as a NUTS3 region. For
the 113 East-German NUTS3 regions (11 NUTS2 regions) we use GDP per capita from 1991 instead of 1988. GDP
per capita is measured in PPP terms. Employment share is calculated as the fraction of total population. Industry
as well as service share are calculated as fraction of total employment.
Table 4: Eligibility and actual treatment under Objective 1 according
to 75% GDP per capita threshold
Recipients Non-recipients Recipients Non-recipients
NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS3 NUTS3
1989-93 EU12
Eligible 40 2 233 84
Non Eligible 12 133 47 645
1994-99 EU15
Eligible 43 2 257 110
Non Eligible 15 149 46 672
2000-06 EU25
Eligible 115 7 357 132
Non Eligible 8 149 54 664
Notes: Eligible regions are characterized by a GDP per capita of less than 75% of EU average in the qualifying years of
each programming period (3-year average over the years preceding the start of a new programming period). Recipient
regions are those that did effectively receive Objective 1 status. We miss information on the four French overseas-
departe´ments and the two autonomous Portuguese regions Madeira and Azores for all three years. Regarding the
East-German regions we miss GDP per capita information for the qualifying year of the first period. However, we
declare them eligible in the first period, too. GDP per capita is measured in PPP terms.
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Table 7: Objective 1 and GDP per capita growth (sub-periods)
1989-1993 1989-1993 1994-1999 1994-1999 2000-2006 2000-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Objective 1 .068 .012 .012 .010 .013 .011
(.006)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Population growth rate -.942 -.314 -.136
(.233)∗∗∗ (.074)∗∗∗ (.098)
Employment share -.013 -.008 -.005
(.009) (.005) (.005)
Investment rate .405 .016 -.017
(.019)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗ (.010)∗
Industry share .059 -.005 -.033
(.012)∗∗∗ (.009) (.007)∗∗∗
Service share .058 .020 -.028
(.011)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
Population density -.001 -.0002 .001
(.0008) (.0005) (.0007)∗∗
Const. .036 -.092 .040 .031 .033 .067
(.0007)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.0005)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.0005)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
Obs. 1009 1009 1085 1085 1207 1207
R2 .238 .683 .117 .179 .145 .176
Notes: We take the sample of EU12 NUTS3 regions for the first period, EU15 NUTS3 regions for the second and
EU25 for the third programming period. We miss information on the four French overseas-departe´ments and the
two autonomous Portuguese regions Madeira and Azores for all three periods. For the 113 East-German NUTS3
regions we use average yearly growth rates between 1991 and 1993 and initial values from 1991 for the controls.
Hence, we end up with 1009 NUTS3 regions in the first period, 1085 in the second and 1207 in the last period.
Note that there is no data on investment rates for the Baltic regions as well as the Slovenian regions. Therefore, we
impute investment rates from the national level for these regions.
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Table 8: Objective 1 and employment growth (sub-periods)
1989-1993 1989-1993 1994-1999 1994-1999 2000-2006 2000-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Objective 1 -.022 -.0001 -.002 .003 -.007 .005
(.003)∗∗∗ (.005) (.002) (.002) (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Population growth rate 1.046 .795 .861
(.173)∗∗∗ (.099)∗∗∗ (.086)∗∗∗
Investment rate -.107 -.005 -.047
(.016)∗∗∗ (.009) (.011)∗∗∗
Industry share -.023 .022 .022
(.019) (.014) (.008)∗∗∗
Service share .010 .050 .040
(.022) (.015)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
Population density -.002 -.001 -.001
(.0008)∗∗∗ (.0005)∗∗ (.0003)∗∗∗
Const. .007 .025 .007 -.032 .008 -.018
(.0005)∗∗∗ (.017) (.0004)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗ (.0003)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
Obs. 1009 1009 1085 1085 1207 1207
R2 .107 .343 .002 .137 .044 .297
Notes: We take the sample of EU12 NUTS3 regions for the first period, EU15 NUTS3 regions for the second and
EU25 for the third programming period. We miss information on the four French overseas-departe´ments and the
two autonomous Portuguese regions Madeira and Azores for all three periods. For the 113 East-German NUTS3
regions we use average yearly growth rates between 1991 and 1993 and initial values from 1991 for the controls.
Hence, we end up with 1009 NUTS3 regions in the first period, 1085 in the second and 1207 in the last period.
Note that there is no data on investment rates for the Baltic regions as well as the Slovenian regions. Therefore, we
impute investment rates from the national level for these regions.
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Table 9: Objective 1 and GDP per capita growth (spatial control
exclusion-mechanism)
Full sample 70-80% 65-85% 60-90%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Objective 1 .022 .021 .024 .023 .023
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
Population growth rate -1.545 -1.550 -1.573 -1.734
(.313)∗∗∗ (.324)∗∗∗ (.532)∗∗∗ (.477)∗∗∗
Employment share .049 .313 .102 .092
(.038) (.095)∗∗∗ (.080) (.066)
Service share .138 .147 .154 .167
(.028)∗∗∗ (.076)∗ (.054)∗∗∗ (.038)∗∗∗
Industry share -.011 -.008 .054 .061
(.031) (.080) (.061) (.046)
Investment rate .563 .585 .674 .622
(.027)∗∗∗ (.045)∗∗∗ (.038)∗∗∗ (.033)∗∗∗
Population density .050 .060 .027 .028
(.020)∗∗ (.039) (.049) (.045)
Const. .052 -.211 -.351 -.298 -.281
(.002)∗∗∗ (.030)∗∗∗ (.079)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗∗ (.038)∗∗∗
Obs. 2392 2392 480 899 1246
R2 .091 .458 .586 .571 .539
Notes: All regressions include time and state fixed effects. We take the sample of EU12 NUTS3 regions for the first
period, EU15 NUTS3 regions for the second and EU25 for the third programming period. We miss information
on the four French overseas-departe´ments and the two autonomous Portuguese regions Madeira and Azores for all
three periods. For the 113 East-German NUTS3 regions we use average yearly growth rates between 1991 and 1993
and initial values from 1991 for the controls. Note that there is no data on investment rates for the Baltic regions
as well as the Slovenian regions. Therefore, we impute investment rates from the national level for these regions.
Hence, we end up with 1009 NUTS3 regions in the first period, 1085 in the second and 1207 in the last period. The
distance matrices are used such that only those non-Objective 1 regions are included in the control group that are
more than 200 km away from the next Objective 1 region. This confines the sample in each period such that pooling
those periods leaves 2392 observations. The last three columns report the 70-80%, the 65-85% and the 60-90%
interval-regressions. Whether an observation lies within the interval is determined by the NUTS2 mother-region’s
GDP per capita in the qualifying years.
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Table 10: Objective 1 and employment growth (spatial control
exclusion-mechanism)
Full sample 70-80% 65-85% 60-90%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Objective 1 .004 .005 -.002 .0004 .003
(.002)∗ (.002)∗∗ (.004) (.003) (.003)
Population growth rate .810 1.155 .697 .800
(.189)∗∗∗ (.251)∗∗∗ (.304)∗∗ (.270)∗∗∗
Service share -.030 -.289 -.133 -.067
(.046) (.093)∗∗∗ (.077)∗ (.058)
Industry share -.037 -.297 -.174 -.106
(.039) (.079)∗∗∗ (.060)∗∗∗ (.050)∗∗
Investment rate -.129 -.092 -.134 -.145
(.019)∗∗∗ (.034)∗∗∗ (.033)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗
Population density .007 .090 .078 .060
(.013) (.030)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗
Const. -.004 .053 .240 .130 .082
(.001)∗∗∗ (.037) (.074)∗∗∗ (.055)∗∗ (.043)∗
Obs. 2392 2392 480 899 1246
R2 .059 .175 .288 .262 .218
Notes: All regressions include time and state fixed effects. We take the sample of EU12 NUTS3 regions for the first
period, EU15 NUTS3 regions for the second and EU25 for the third programming period. We miss information
on the four French overseas-departe´ments and the two autonomous Portuguese regions Madeira and Azores for all
three periods. For the 113 East-German NUTS3 regions we use average yearly growth rates between 1991 and 1993
and initial values from 1991 for the controls. Note that there is no data on investment rates for the Baltic regions
as well as the Slovenian regions. Therefore, we impute investment rates from the national level for these regions.
Hence, we end up with 1009 NUTS3 regions in the first period, 1085 in the second and 1207 in the last period. The
distance matrices are used such that only those non-Objective 1 regions are included in the control group that are
more than 200 km away from the next Objective 1 region. This confines the sample in each period such that pooling
those periods leaves 2392 observations. The last three columns report the 70-80%, the 65-85% and the 60-90%
interval-regressions. Whether an observation lies within the interval is determined by the NUTS2 mother-region’s
GDP per capita in the qualifying years.
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Table 11: Objective 1 and regional performance: 70-80% interval
(2SLS)
1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006 GDP per Capita Employment
Probit Probit Probit Fixed Fixed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Objective 1 .027 .006
(.010)∗∗∗ (.007)
Employment share -56.611 -57.002 27.057 .266
(17.180)∗∗∗ (20.875)∗∗∗ (18.405) (.059)∗∗∗
Industry share -18.242 -4.754 -66.107 -.007 -.263
(7.503)∗∗ (12.256) (25.734)∗∗ (.082) (.056)∗∗∗
Service share -75.416 -79.266 -16.761 .172 -.271
(27.558)∗∗∗ (35.686)∗∗ (28.422) (.080)∗∗ (.055)∗∗∗
Population density 4.794 4.471 5.043 .058 .083
(1.169)∗∗∗ (.897)∗∗∗ (1.147)∗∗∗ (.045) (.031)∗∗∗
Population growth rate 116.584 -1.347 52.457 -1.591 1.184
(48.427)∗∗ (52.836) (43.127) (.294)∗∗∗ (.197)∗∗∗
Investment rate -52.935 -176.977 -342.838 .554 -.092
(45.010) (97.248)∗ (87.394)∗∗∗ (.041)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗
Peripheral 1.252 .959 1.126
(.511)∗∗ (.434)∗∗ (.442)∗∗
Border Region -.331 .870 -1.163
(.544) (.524)∗ (.445)∗∗∗
Area of Region (m2) .658 .414 .260
(.226)∗∗∗ (.208)∗∗ (.142)∗
Employment share 2 58.850 51.471 -55.248
(19.559)∗∗∗ (26.590)∗ (25.520)∗∗
Industry share 2 18.188 -15.520 82.494
(14.360) (23.530) (47.770)∗
Service share 2 53.642 48.271 -3.533
(20.793)∗∗∗ (26.742)∗ (21.882)
Population density 2 -1.089 -.866 -.860
(.283)∗∗∗ (.204)∗∗∗ (.219)∗∗∗
Population growth rate 2 -7525.202 1289.900 -752.544
(4022.118)∗ (4346.563) (1909.919)
Investment rate 2 182.938 505.793 807.875
(111.894) (265.408)∗ (219.730)∗∗∗
Area of Region (m2) 2 -.018 -.014 .005
(.016) (.017) (.006)
EU12 2.692
(.762)∗∗∗
EU15 -9.181
(1.497)∗∗∗
Const. 49.153 37.249 72.445 -.333 .222
(15.389)∗∗∗ (16.202)∗∗ (14.584)∗∗∗ (.069)∗∗∗ (.046)∗∗∗
Obs. 186 203 209 598 598
R2 0.74 0.66 0.73 0.55 0.26
Notes: All regressions include time fixed effects. We take the sample of EU12 NUTS3 regions for the first period,
EU15 NUTS3 regions for the second and EU25 for the third programming period. We miss information on the
four French overseas-departe´ments and the two autonomous Portuguese regions Madeira and Azores for all three
periods. For the 113 East-German NUTS3 regions we use average yearly growth rates between 1991 and 1993 and
initial values from 1991 for the controls. Hence, we end up with 1009 NUTS3 regions in the first period, 1085 in
the second and 1207 in the last period. Pooling those periods gives 3301 observations. Note that there is no data
on investment rates for the Baltic regions as well as the Slovenian regions. Therefore, we impute investment rates
from the national level for these regions. The first three columns report the first stage probit regression. Predicted
values from these regressions are used as instruments for actual treatment status in the second stage IV estimations
reported in the last two columns. The first stage as well as the second stage is calculated within the 70-80% interval.
Whether an observation lies within the interval is determined by the NUTS2 mother-region’s GDP per capita in
the qualifying years.
Figure 1: Objective 1 regions
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Figure 2: Objective 1 status and the 75% GDP threshold
1989-1993
1994-1999
2000-2006
Figure 3: Regions changing Objective 1 status
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